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MONEY AND REFORM: 





I. The Issue 
 
Until recently monetarists did not explicitly argue the case for the 
endogenization of money and monetary institutions in their discussions 
of reforms. Many monetarists continue to argue that these institutions are 
exogenous and thereby subject to the exercise of a Smithian freedom of 
choice in selecting and mounting monetary reform. To be sure the 
character and type of monetary institutions and the role of money are to 
a good measure determined by their socio-political and economic 
environment.1 
 
Whatever approach is correct and appropriate economists do agree on 
the importance of ideas and the considerable lag between these ideas 
and their execution. And, indeed, John Maynard Keynes put the issue 
succinctly  at the end of his General Theory: "Practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the  slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, 
who  hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back."2 
 
There are reasons for the existence of the lag. Milton Friedman argues 
that  one  reason  why  economists  have  a  difficult  ntime  in convincing  
                                                          
1 See George Macesich and H. Tsai, Money in Economic Systems (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 25. 
 
2 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, First Harbinger Edition, 1964), 383. 
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policy makers is that they assume policy makers always wish to do the 
right thing.3 That is, they assume that policy makers have the public 
interest as their primary concern.  According  to  Friedman, policy 
makers primarily think of their interest, although they believe that it 
coincides with the public's interest. 
 
The implication of our discussion for the reform of former socialist 
countries is clear. The processes will be long and difficult.  At  this  point 
it is not at all clear that many of the participants have a firm grasp and 
understanding of the issues involved.  And certainly the interests of 
policy makers do not always coincide with the public's interest. 
 
 
II. A Stable Monetary Arrangement 
 
If reform is to be successful, the key role that money plays in society 
must be explicitly addressed. Our discussion suggests the importance 
writers in the classical and neo-classical traditions attach to money. Its 
importance is underscored in the reform processes because it comes 
between man and his objectives. Some writers, including nineteenth 
century Marxists who saw the idolatry of money as a species of 
reminisfication, argue that it is alienating or an illusion that led man to 
believe that he could possess through wealth what he had lost through 
work-his essence and being. 
 
Thus it is that Georg Simmel, for instance, identifies  two  likely sources 
of  trouble  for  the  human institution  of money.4 One source is that 
since  individuals  do not receive income in kind but rather in money, 
they  are  exposed  to  the  uncertainties  originating  from  fluctuations in 
                                                          
3 Milton Friedman, "Economists and Economic Policy", Economic Inquiry XXIV 
(January 1986); 1-10. 
 
4 Georg  Simmel,  The  Philosophy  of  Money.  Translation  by  T.   Bottomore  and 
D. Frisby, with  Introduction  by  D. Frisby. (London and Boston: Rutledge and 
Keegan Paul, 1977, 1978), 160. 
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the purchasing power of money. The other is that the very success of a 
"free monetary order" encourages the development of socialist or 
collectivist ideas which serve to undermine the individualistic order based 
on free markets and money. 
 
Monetary uncertainty will tend to move the social order away from the 
use of money and markets toward a greater reliance on one form or 
another of greater government control or command organization thereby 
strengthening bureaucracy and its political influence. Furthermore, 
monetary instability and market failure are closely linked and both serve 
to weaken the social fabric. 
 
The use of the monetary system and monetary policy to pursue changing 
goals and objectives threaten society's responsibility to maintain trust 
and faith in money. This in turn casts doubt on the monetary organization 
and indeed market democracy itself. The nineteenth century view of 
society's responsibility to maintain trust and faith in money was 
supported by the bitter eighteenth century experiences with currency 
excess. Most classical and neoclassical economists underscored 
society's responsibility to preserve trust and faith in money. 
 
Many of these economists would be less than enthusiastic in support of 
discretionary monetary policy to exploit the presumed short-run non-
neutrality of money to increase permanent employment and output by 
increasing the stock of money. They would agree that although an 
arbitrary increase in money will not necessarily permanently disrupt 
relative prices, such manipulation sets into motion forces whose 
consequences for social stability are very serious indeed. Since there is 
no human power that can guarantee against possible misuse of the 
money issuing authority, to give such authority to government is to invite 
destruction of the social order. It is for this reason that they argued that it 
is best to tie paper money to a metal value established by law or the 
economy.5 
                                                          
5 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 160 
 124
It was also John Maynard  Keynes  in his Economic Consequences of 
the Peace (1919), who told us there is no better means to overturn an 
existing social structure  than  to  debauch  the currency.6 He also 
alleged that Lenin espoused that the  best  way to overthrow the 
capitalist system was to debauch the currency. Ironically, some can 
argue that Keynes' subsequent teaching opened the flood gates of 
inflation in the post-World War II period, even though he personally 
attempted to close those gates shortly before his death in 1946.7 
 
Keynes clearly shared a monetary heritage  common  to the classical 
and neoclassical schools of economic thought. What sets him  apart 
were his views on the conduct of monetary policy. For instance, Milton 
Friedman writes that where he disagrees with the views Keynes 
expressed in Monetary Reform is with the appropriate method for 
achieving a stable price level. Keynes favored managed money and 
managed exchange rates, that is, discretionary control by monetary 
authorities.8 
 
It is the exercise of discretionary policy by monetary authorities 
advocated by Keynes that underscores his differences with Monetarists 
led by Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek's Austrians. His desire to place 
the execution of monetary policy at the discretion of public-spirited and 
competent civil servants sets him in  disagreement  with  monetarists 





                                                          
6 John Maynard Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace. (London: 
Macmillan, 1920). 
 
7 F.A. Hayek, "The Keynes Centenary: The Austrian Critique, "The Economist (June 
11, 1983), 39. 
 
8 Milton Friedman, "A Monetarist Reflects: The Keynes Centenary", The Economist 
(June 4, 1983), 19. 
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The value of market democracy is questioned by people who do not 
believe that it is possible to make it work in terms of specific goals which 
society should, in their opinion, pursue. The exercise of market 
democracy implies that it is possible for individuals to choose between a 
multiplicity of ends. This in turn requires that no arbitrary or capricious 
steps will be taken to alter this exercise in favor of particular individuals, 
groups, or interests. The importance of money and the monetary 
organization is clear. A stable and predictable monetary policy can not 
survive if it is directed to the shifting goals of price stability, full 
employment, economic growth, and economic equality. It will change 
with the goals adopted. 
 
 
GUIDELINES FOR MONEY IN REFORM 
 
It is useful to consider briefly guidelines put forward by important views of 
money for a stable monetary organization to serve reform. If monetarist 
guidelines are adopted, this requires acceptance of monetarism's 
principal tenet, as in the quantity theory of money, that inflation is at all 
times and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Its principal policy 
corollary is that only a slow and steady rate of increase in the money 
supply-one in line with the real growth of the economycan ensure price 
stability. 
 
Milton Friedman (The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory, First 
Wincott, Memorial Lecture (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1970)) 
summarizes the monetarist view on the relationship between the money 
supply and price level. 
 
1. There is a consistent, though not precise, relation between the 
rate of growth of the quantity of money and the rate of growth of 
nominal income. 
2. This relationship is not obvious to the naked eye-largely because 
it takes time for changes in monetary growth to affect income. 
How long this process will take is within itself a variable. 
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3. An average change in the rate of monetary growth produces a 
change in the rate of growth of nominal income to about six to 
nine months later. This is an average which does not hold in 
every individual case. 
4. The changed rate of growth in nominal income typically shows up 
first in output and hardly at all in prices. 
5. The average effect on prices comes about six to nine months 
after the effect on income and output, so the total delay between 
a change in monetary growth and a change in the rate of inflation 
averages around twelve to eighteen months. 
6. Even after allowances for delays in the effect of monetary growth, 
the relation is far from perfect, for there's many a slip "twist the 
monetary change and the income change". 
7. Short-term monetary changes of five or ten years primarily affect 
output over decades, although the rate of monetary growth 
affects prices primarily. 
 
The monetarists' view,  as  summarized in Friedman's Counter-
Revolution,  questions the doctrine advanced by Keynes that variations 
in government spending, taxes,  and the national debt could stabilize 
both the price level and the real economy. This doctrine has come to be 
called "The Keynesian Revolution". 
 
The "Austrian School", through members as  Carl Menger, Georg 
Simmel (a sociologist), Ludwig von Mises, and Friedreich von Hayek, 
provides useful insights  into the  monetary  system  as  an integral part 
of the social structure. They also serve as guides to monetary reform. 
Their views differ significantly from both Keynesian and monetarist 
views, although Milton Friedman  and  some  monetarists  come  closer 
to the Austrians in their emphasis on "monetary rules" and a stable 
monetary order. 
 
According to the Austrian view, money and the monetary system is the 
unintended product  of  social  evolution  in  much  the  same  fashion  as 
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the legal system.9 Money is a social institution-a public good. It is not 
simply  another  durable  good held in the form of "real balances" by 
utility maximizing individuals  or profit maximizing firms as Keynesian 
and monetarist views hold. However, useful the tools of supply and 
demand analysis applied to money as a private durable good, 
Keynesians and monetarists miss the full consequences of monetary 
instability. 
 
In essence, the monetary system is an integral part of the social fabric 
Whose threads include faith  and trust which makes possible the 
exercise of rational choice  and the  development of human freedom. 
This is misunderstood by the very people who benefit from it. It is this 
misunderstanding of the social role of  money  as  a critical element in 
the market mechanism and the  need  for  confidence in the  stability of 
its purchasing power that came to dominate much of Keynesian and 
monetarist monetary thought in the postwar period. This 
misunderstanding is the ideological key to the use of discretionary 
monetary policies for monetary expansion as an unfailing means of 
increasing output and employment and reduction interest rates. 
 
Herbert Frankel writes that Keynes, following Georg Friedrich Knapp, 
presents the monetary system as a creation of the state as such 
available for manipulation by government consisting mostly of wise and 
well-educated people disinterestedly promoting the best interests of 
society. The fact that  such an arrangement curtails individual  choice 
and decision  did not disturb Keynes, who saw little reason to believe 
that those choices  and  decisions benefit society. In essence, it is at 
best and elitist view of  government  so familiar to Great Britain at the 
turn of the century or  at  worst  a  totalitarian  government  on  the model 
                                                          
9 David Laidler and Nickolas Rowe, "Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money: A Review 
Article for Economists", Journal of Economic Literature (March 1980), 97-105; S. 
Herbert Frankel, Two Philosophies of Money: The Conflict of Trust and Authority 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977); and Review of Frankel's study by David Laidler 
in Journal of Economic Literature (June 1979): 570-572. 
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of the Soviet Union.10 
 
David Laidler takes exception to Frankel's argument that Keynes is the 
architect of short-run monetary policy that seeks to exploit monetary 
illusion in order to trick people into taking actions which, if they could 
correctly foresee their consequences, they would not take. Such 
"trickery" is not the policy product of the 1930s when Keynes believed 
that undertaking an activist monetary policy to deal with unemployment 
would be what individua; agents desired but were prevented from 
accomplishing on their own because of price and market mechanism 
failure. Keynes, in effect, thought he was dealing with the issue of 
involuntary unemployment. It was in the 1950s and 1960s that the ideal 
of a stable inflation-unemployment tradeoff generated a "money illusion" 
available for exploitation by policy makers. 
 
In my view, Laidler is correct that policies derived from Keynesian 
philosophy of money may not be the fundamental reason that faith in the 
institutions of a free society is threatened. Though, again, the policies of 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s do owe much to Keynes' followers, if not 
Keynes himself. Keynes did provide, however, the theoretical apparatus 
to make possible the articulation of his postWorld War I vision. It was in 
the late 1970s and 1980s that the "chickens came home to roost", so to 
speak, with the era of rational expectations and growing distrust of 
government.11 
 
One can attribute too much responsibility to Keynes and his followers for 
the lack of faith and trust in the "old order", as argued by the followers of 
the Austrian view of money. Indeed, the durability of the old order was 
questioned by Simmel long before Keynes and his followers appeared. 
                                                          
10 For  a  discussion  of this issue,  see  George Macesich, The International 
Monetary Economy and the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1981). Chapters 1-2 
and references cited there. 
 
11 George Macesich,  Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations (New York: 
Praeger, 1987). 
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This durability is questioned by Simmel throughout his Philosophy of 
Money. His study, as we noted, is concerned not simply with money as a 
unit of account, a store of value and medium of exchange-but with the 
free market economy in which the monetary system is an integral part, 
and with the relationship between the institution of such an economy and 
justice, liberty, and the nature of man as a social being. The focus is on 
exchange as one of the most fundamental functions which serves to tie 
individuals into a cohesive social group. Since barter exchange is 
inconvenient, there naturally developed a group of individuals who are 
specialists in exchange and the institution of money which serves to 
solve the problem of the dual coincidence of barter. As soon as money 
enters the picture and the dual coincidence of barter is resolved, 
exchange ceases to be a simple relationship between two individuals. 
Simmel notes that the ensuing generalization of claims made possible by 
money transfers places these claims for realization upon the general 
economic community and government as its representative. Unlike other 
things that have a specific content form which they derive their value, 
money derives its content, according to Simmel, from its value. In turn, 
its value owes much to the implicit guarantee given by society and the 
community and little to the physical properties of money. It is, in effect, 
based on the confidence in the sociopolitical organization and order. In 
this view, the British pound sterling, formerly, and the American dollar, 
currently, owe their value more to the political and economic power and 
prestige of their institutions than to the physical properties of the pound 
and dollar. This confidence in the political and economic institutions of a 
country is "trust". 
 
"Trust" the is the ingredient that bond society together and the more of it 
individuals have in a society's institutions in general and its money in 
particular, the more extensive and intense the use of money will be in a 
economy. By and large the consequences of such developments are 
beneficial to the society in that man's achievements are enhanced not 
only in the economy but in all other endeavors. Indeed, freedom and 
justice are promoted by the development and growth of exchange and 
the monetary economy. 
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Consequently, the individual is able to act independently of other 
individuals while at the same time becoming more depending on society 
as a whole. That is, and individual becomes more dependent on the 
achievements of individuals and less so on the peculiarities of 
personalities. The loosening of bonds serves to promote economic 
freedom. It may or may not promote political freedom at the same time. 
 
Keynes, too, was concerned with monetary stability and the fragile 
nature of a money-using market economy and the social order that went 
with it. He was also well aware of the need for trust in the stability of 
purchasing power if the market mechanism was to function properly. 
Indeed, to Keynes money is not just another commodity. A money 
economy is very different from a barter economy. The idea was lost, 
write Laidler and Rowe, as the Hicksian IS-LM (Investment/Saving-
Liquidity Money) interpretation of the General Theory came to dominate 
monetary economics, monetarist as well as so-called Keynesian. The 
dominance of this incomplete version of Keynes in subsequent debates 
has surely been the main reason for their participants having neglected 
"Austrian" ideas on these matters.12 
 
The story, however, is very different on the conduct of monetary policy 
where Keynes and his followers depart significantly from the Austrian 
and monetarist paths. These differences are so profound as to 
overwhelm areas of agreement. As we note, Keynes believed firmly in 
discretionary monetary policy and viewed the gold standard as a relic. 
Modern Austrians hold to the gold standard. The monetarists argue for a 
given growth rate in the stock of money. The difference between the 
Austrians and the monetarists is essentially about means to achieve 
agreed upon ends, although the latter do not stress the role of stability in 
promoting trust and so facilitating the functioning of markets. The 
Austrians, while distrusting the bureaucrats, are more skeptical than 
monetarists about the stability of the demand for money function and so 
argue for pegging the price of money in terms of gold, relying on the 
stability of the relative price of gold in terms of goods in general. 
                                                          
12 Laidler and Rowe, "Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money", 103. 
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Frankel, in his study Two Philosophies of Money, directs attention to 
the erroneous "nominalist" theories of money which imply that money is 
something external to the fabric of society, a thing or commodity in its 
own right, which governments are entitled to manipulate in pursuit of 
their own limited economic or social ends. He draws and compares the 
views of Simmel and Keynes, arguing that both understood the economic 
uses and psychological power of money. Simmel and Keynes were also 
sensitive to its resultant influence on human character and behavior. 
More important, perhaps, Frankel demonstrates how the views of 
Simmel and Keynes summarize the conflicting ideologies of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and serve to place in perspective 
contemporary monetary problems. 
 
Differences in monetary views will manifest themselves in reform 
guidelines. Thus Keynes and many of his followers believe that a free 
monetary order might not work in terms of specific goals which society 
should, in their opinion, pursue. This view, shared by Keynes, leads to 
utopian attempts to make the uncertain certain by control of society 
according to plan as well as by transformation of man. Its adherents 
believe that we now possess the technical tools and scientific knowledge 
to enable us to control monetary behavior, not only within a nation, but 
even internationally, and thereby not only the rate of economic change, 
but progress also. Monetarists, on the other hand, would support 
Friedman's view that "we are in danger of asking it to accomplish tasks 
that it cannot achieve and, as a result, in danger of preventing it from 
making the contribution that it is capable of making."13 
 
What guidelines for reform are forthcoming from Keynes? According to 
Hicks, Keynes, in his search for a workable monetary standard, founded 
the labor standard and its dependence on society's sociopoliticall 
processes in the General Theory.14  
                                                          
13 Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy", in The optimum Quantity of 
Money and other Essays (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), 99. 
 
14 John R. Hicks, "The Keynes Centenary: A Skeptical Follower", The Economist 
(June 18, 1983), 17-10. 
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Because of other things, this translated into a managed monetary 
standard and justification for its discretionary management by central 
monetary authorities composed of an enlightened elite. 
 
Keynes' efforts were translated into a "managed monetary standard" and 
yielded readily to discretionary monetary manipulation by authorities. The 
consequent monetary uncertainty generated by such manipulation has 
had the effect on balance of casting doubt on the credibility of these 
authorities, their policies, and ultimately on the monetary regime itself. In 
the process, the long=term price level has lost its anchor. These are only 
the more obvious unintended consequences of Keynes' efforts. 
 
The unintended consequences of Keynes' search for a workable 
monetary standard are but another illustration of money in history and 
the unintended perverse effects. The best intentional changes do at 
times lead via unintended consequences to undesirable results. Keynes' 
efforts are no exception. 
 
Indeed, the idea that the unintended effects of human actions and 
decisions often have unforeseen consequences came into currency in 
the eighteenth century confidently supported the belief that institutional 
changes can be so engineered a to bring about a perfect society.15 The 
idea of the perfectible society is deeply embedded in critiques of social 
and economic order. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea 
served to launch strong criticism of capitalism and the social and 
economic order it represented. In the twentieth century, the idea also 
served Keynes in his search for a workable monetary standard. 
 
In fact, Keynes' flexibility and fine tuning propensities are certainly 
consistent with ideas flowing from the French Enlightenment. His 
propensities, writes Friedman, "were in accord with his elitist political 
philosophy, his conception of society run by an able corps of public 
spirited intellectuals entitled to power that they could be counted on to 
                                                          
15 See Albert Hirschaman, "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, 
Destructive,  or  Feeble?"  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  (December  1982): 
1463-84. 
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exercise for the masses. They may also have been related to an 
excessive confidence in his ability to shape public opinion.16 His flexibility 
and attribution to others of his own capacity to change his views by 
changing circumstances also led to serious misreading of matters far 
removed from economic policy.17 
 
An example of Keynes' flexibility and misreading of events is provided by 
Hayek when he writes, "I am convinced that he owed his extraordinary 
influence in this field (economics), to which he (Keynes) gave only a 
small part of his energy, to an almost unique combination of other gifts." 
He had gained the ear of the "advanced" members much earlier and 
contributed greatly to a trend in conflict with his own classical liberal 
beginnings. The time when he had become the idol of the leftist 
intellectuals was in fact when in 1933 he had shocked many of his earlier 
admirers by an essay on "National Self-Sufficiency" in the New 
Statesman and Nation (reprinted with equal enthusiasm by the Yale 
Review the Communist Science and Society and the National Socialist 
Schmollers Jahrbuch).18 
 
In the essay in question, Hayek quotes Keynes: 
 
The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the 
hands of which we found ourselves after the war is not a 
success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is 
not virtuous-and it does not deliver the goods. In short, we 
dislike it and are beginning to despise it. 
 
Hayek writes that Keynes later and in the same mood state in the 
preface to the German translation of the General Theory, 
                                                          
16 Milton Friedman, "The Keynes Centenary: A Monetarist Reflects', The Economist 
(June 4, 1983), 17. 
 
17 Milton Friedman, "The Keynes Centenary", 18. 
 
18 F.A. Hayek, "The Keynes Centenary: The Austrian Critique", The Economist (June 
11, 1983), 41. 
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... he (Keynes) frankly recommended his policy proposal as 
being more easily adapted to the condition of a totalitarian state 
than those in which production is guided by free competition.19 
 
Criticism of capitalism's shortcomings is a view that Keynes shared with 
other contemporaries. Keynes, of course, was also a man with a very 
sharp sense of history, theory, and policy. In Chapter 24, "Concluding 
Notes on the Social Philosophy Toward Which the General Theory Might 
Lead" of his General Theory, he writes that 
 
... the authoritarian state systems of today seem to solve the 
problem of unemployment at the expense of efficiency and 
freedom. But it may be possible by a right analysis of the 
problem to cure the disease whilst preserving efficiency and 
freedom.20 
 
Keynes, the liberal economist, was certainly well aware of the 
advantages and value of individualism and the capitalist market system. 
Thus, he writes, 
 
Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of 
government, involved in the task of adjusting to one another the 
propensity to consume and the inducement to invest would 
seem... both the only practicable means of avoiding the 
destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety and the 
condition of the successful functioning of individual initiative. 
 
In effect, Keynes felt that shortcomings of the capitalist market-oriented 
individualist system could be overcome with appropriate policies of 
government intervention while at the same time preserving the systems's 
efficency and freedom. On this point, Keynes is consistent with the 
eighteenth century view that social engineering via appropriate 
                                                          
19 F.A. Hayek, "The Keynes Centenary", 41. 
 
20 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New 
York:Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., First Harbinger Edition, 1964), 381. 
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government policies can improve society's lot. Indeed, Keynes is also 
consistent with the "self-destruction thesis" of capitalism discussed by 
Albert Hirschman and many other past and present writers, including 
conservatives and Marxists. 
 
The serious misreading of public policy on Keynes' part suggested by 
Friedman and confirmed by post-war events underscores the importance 
of constraining a country's bureaucratic and political elite. It is clear that 
such constraint should be within a system of well-defined rules as 
advanced by Milton Friedman and other monetarists. This is particularly 
the case in the application of monetary guidelines to reform. 
 
The reason is straightforward. We do not have at our disposal scientific 
knowledge that would justify fine tuning monetary policy with any 
reasonable expectation of success. To give bureaucrats, in this instance 
central bankers, discretionary power to fine tune monetary policy is to 
ask them to do the impossible. Thus monetarists (or quantity theorists) 
urge a policy system based on rules and nondiscretionary intervention 
into the economy. Its principal policy corollary, as we have noted, is that 
only a slow and steady rate of increase in the money supply-one in line 
with the real growth of the economy-can insure price stability. 
 
This is, of course, disputed by people whose preference is administrative 
discretionary intervention to maintain aggregate demand in the economy. 
The central issue in the disagreement, essentially, is over defined versus 
undefined or discretionary policy systems. On this score the major 
opponents of the monetarist position are modern Keynesians and central 
bankers whose position is that defined policy systems are inferior to 
administrative discretion. In effect, the modern Keynesian position and 
that of central bankers does not involve a search for optimal decision 
rules for monetary (and fiscal) policy. Central bankers are more or less in 
accord since it is consistent with their view that the conduct of monetary 
policy is an "art" not to be encumbered by explicit policy rules. 
 
The modern Keynesian approach is, in effect, the economic branch of 
the political interventionist position whose defining principle is the 
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extensive use of government power without definite guides or policy 
systems. It has important allies in central banks with whom it shares 
many banking school ideas. Its opponents, including Monetarists, are 
those seeking lawful policy systems and limitations on the undefined 
exercise of power by government. 
 
Culbertson puts it well when he writes, 
 
A basic difficulty with undefined policy systems... is that since 
the policies to be followed are uncertain, they may prove to be 
disastrously inappropriate. Such policy systems are risky. The 
intellectual difficulty of the proponent of discretionary policy 
formation is a real one. If the policy matters, then certain correct 
choices must be made, which that power must reside in those 
particular men who will make the correct decisions-but in a 
context in which the correct choices themselves are asserted to 
be incapable of being defined (since it is the basis of rejection 
of defined policy systems). Inevitably, it seems, the approach 
implies the existence of an elite or priestly class that promises 
to accomplish the indefinable.21 
 
For the discretionary outcome, it does matter which economist sits at the 
elbow of which President or Prime Minister after all. The Monetarist 
position is that a "political economist" is really not needed, given a well-
defined policy system. 
 
The Austrian view for monetary guidelines includes some form of gold 
standard as constraint on the domestic and international monetary 
system. Gold proposals, however, have not met with notable success.22  
                                                          
21 John M. Culberison, Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilization Policy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 535. 
 
22 See a useful summary by M. D. 8ordo, "The Classical Gold Standard: Some 
Lesson for Today", Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis (May 1981):1-16; 
8leiberg and J.Grant, "For Real Money: The Dollar Should Be as Good."Editorial 
commentary in Baryon's (June 15, 1981); L. E. Lehrman and Henry S. Reuss 
debated issue "Should the U.S. Return to the Gold Standard?" Christian Science 
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This in not surprising. What is often lacking in these proposals is an 
appreciation and understanding of the fact that the gold standard was 
more than a monetary standard. It cannot be understood, as it cannot be 
operated successfully, except as part of a socioeconomic, political, and 
philosophic system in which it was developed. This system no longer 
exists for reasons discussed above. 
 
Moreover, there is a tendency for some gold advocates to idealize the 
gold standard and to overlook some of its more troublesome aspects. 
Thus between 1815 and 1914, there were twelve major crises or panics 
in the United States which pushed up interest rates, created severe 
unemployment, and suspended specie payments (conversion of the 
dollar into gold) in addition to 14 more minor recessions.23 Between 1879 
and 1965, a period when America was on some sort of gold standard, 
the consumer price index rose by an average of only 1.4 percent a year. 
On the other hand, the severe bouts of inflation were followed by deep 
deflation in which prices actually fell. For instance, in the 1921 world 
recession, when production actually fell for only a few months, there 
were 30-40 percent cuts in manufacturing wages in some countries in 
the period 1920-1922. 
 
An alternative proposal, which was pushed from theory to practice by 
F.A. Hayek, is that governmental monopoly in the supply of money be 
                                                                                                                                        
Monitor (September 21, 1981); The Economist (September 5, 1981); 11-12 (the 
report of the U.S.Gold Commission studying greater role forgold in the United 
States): see also Martin Bronfenbrenner, "The CurrencyChoice Defense." Challenge 
(January/February 1980); 31-36: 
The gold clause was relegalized by Section 463 of the U.S. Code in October 1977. 
Little publicity has been accorded change; few people know about it; any ruse of gold 
clauses may lead Congress to reverse its 1977 action. On the other hand, that action 
may be a straw in the wind; it has friends in Congress; extension of the legal tender 
privilege to other currencies and thus freer competition between currencies may be 
closer in the U.S. market than anyone realizes. (Ibid.36) 
See also Anna J. Schwartz, "The U.S. Gold Commission and the Resurgence of 
Interest in a Return to the Gold Standard." Proceedings and Reports, Vol.17 (1983) 
Tallahassee: Center for Yugoslav-American Studies, Research, and Exchanges, The 
Florida State University; Dr. Schwartz was Executive Director of the U. S. Gold 
Commission. 
23 The Economist (September 19, 1981): 17-18. 
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abolished and that the provision of money be left to an unregulated 
market.24 Hayek contends that with private provision of money, money 
users would receive a better product, and the problems of business 
cycles would be ameliorated. Pre-1860 American monetary experience 
with multiple private currencies sheds light on the feasibility of Hayek's 
proposal. The ultimate constraint on the American monetary system was 
the specie or gold standard; Hayek's proposal on this score is not clear. 
 
Another reform proposal is to opt for a fiduciary monetary standard within 
a monetary constitution on the national level. This is essentially a 
Monetarist proposal on the national level. It is suggested by Leland 
Yeager and James Buchanan and incorporates a Friedman-type rule on 
the rate of monetary growth.25 On the international level, fully flexible 
exchange rates would replace the existing "dirty-float" system of 
exchange rates. 
 
One merit of the proposals for constraining the monetary system by a 
monetary constitution and rule is their implicit recognition that the 
nineteenth century integration of market processes has been impaired 
over the past several decades by the emergence in every country of a 
grater measure of state intervention and particularly the discretionary 
nature of such intervention in the monetary sphere. 
 
The monetarist measures advanced as guidelines for monetary reform 
are not necessarily a cure-all for the troubles in the monetary system.  
                                                          
24 F.A.Hayek, Denationalization of Money (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1976). 
 
25 See Leland 8. Yaeger, ed., In Search of a Monetary Constitution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962); James Buchanan, "Predictability: The Criterion of 
Monetary Constitutions," ibid., 155-83; Milton Friedman, "Should There Be an 
Independent Monetary Authority?" ibid., 219-43; Friedman and Schwariz, Monetary 
History, Mi/ton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability (NewYork: Fordham 
University Press, 1959). See also Robert E.Lucas, Jr. "Ru/es, Discretion, and the 
Role of the Economic Advisor," in Rational Expectations and Economic Policy, edited 
by S. Fischer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 199-210; T.J. Sargent 
and N. Wallace, "Rational Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the 
Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy 83 (1975): 241-54. 
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They are in keeping with objectives of those seeking defined guides 
within lawful policy systems. Since these measures could also constrain 
central bankers in their exercise of discretionary monetary authority and 
thus limit the practice of their "art", these measures are not likely to 
generate much enthusiasm on their part, especially since central banks 
would become smaller and less influential bureaucratic institutions. 
Nonetheless, the uncertainty and the undesirable political implications of 
discretionary actions by government authorities including central bankers 
would be curbed.26 
 
                                                          
26 A number of these issues are discussed in George Macesich, The Politics of 
Monetarism: Its Historical and Institutional Development (Totowa, Nj. Rowman and 
Allanheld, 1984). 
